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We study a large-scale, partially outsourced recruitment process. A specialized con-
sultancy assesses applicants' soft-skills on behalf of a client firm, who retains agency
over the hiring decision. We conceptualize this collaboration as an advice-seeking,
advice-utilization process and analyze the effectiveness of hiring recommendations
provided in influencing the client's hiring decisions. Two external HR specialists not
only differ in their soft skill ratings, but also differ in their aggregation of these ratings
into their hiring recommendations. The consultants' recommendations are particu-
larly helpful in separating very suitable from clearly unsuitable candidates but are less
effective in the mid-tier of the skill distribution.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Every individual career begins with being recruited for a job, and the
quality of every employment relationship roots in this initial match
between the organization and its future employee. Yet, hiring
employees is a complex process, and decision-makers in hiring firms
increasingly turn to human resources (HR) consultancies for help and
advice. In this paper, we investigate the consequences of seeking such
consulting advice. Specifically, we analyze a large-scale recruitment
process in which a professionally specialized consultancy assesses
applicants' soft skill endowments on behalf of a client firm. The client
seeks to fill approximately 100 vacancies. The consultancy rates job
applicants' soft skills, reports scores for key job competencies, and
provides hiring recommendations. Further, it documents these sug-
gestions and informs about the assessment criteria. The client, that is,
the advice-seeking company, retains agency and makes the hiring
decisions based on the advice and information received from the
consultancy.
We conceptualize the seeking of information and hiring recom-
mendations as help-seeking behavior (Brooks, Gino, & Schweitzer,
2015). Generally speaking, help-seeking is “the act of asking others
for assistance, information, advice, or support” (Hofmann, Lei, &
Grant, 2009: p. 1262). In employee selection, informational
asymmetries about hard and soft skill endowments can lead to hiring
and matching inefficiencies. Candidates do not necessarily reveal their
private information to the potential employer and may wrongfully sig-
nal that they possess skills, which they actually do not command.
Adverse selection and moral hazards are therefore omnipresent in hir-
ing decisions (Sobel, 2013; Spence, 1973).
Employee selection, especially for large-scale recruiting processes,
provides a prime example where employers rely on external advice to
overcome their own limitations in information, knowledge, or
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experience (Reyt, Wiesenfeld, & Trope, 2016). In surveys, client firms
report that they seek such expert advice second only to the general
motive of reducing process costs (Dapper, 2013; Savino, 2016). Not
surprisingly, the market for recruitment consulting services is out-
pacing other industry segments for the past 2 decades. In times of a
widely proclaimed importance of recruiting scarce talent, recruitment
process outsourcing (RPO) is one of the fastest growing consulting
services, with global growth rates of 22% from 2013–2015, 14% from
2015–2017, and 3.3 billion U.S. dollars in contract revenue in 2017.1
The present research evaluates whether a recruitment con-
sultancy's HR specialists provide information that influence the per-
ceptions of a hiring company about potential hiring candidates. In
particular, we explore how the advice provided by such specialists
sways the hiring decisions of the advice-seeking client company. Gen-
erally, chances for advice-utilization increase if the advisors provide
discrepant opinions and offer perspectives, which contrast with the
advice seeker's presumptions. However, while as advisors, HR special-
ists serve the advisee's interest best by drawing on their professional
expertise to inform; as consultants, they must also meet their client's
consent. Empirically, we therefore analyze how HR specialists form
their hiring recommendations, the degree to which they rely on diver-
gent or convergent criteria for their recommendations, and lastly,
assess the level of congruence between their hiring recommendations
and the client's hiring decisions. Our goal is to understand the rela-
tionship between advice giving and advice-utilization in a partially
outsourced recruitment process.
Our line of inquiry carries several important theoretical and prac-
tical insights. First, we break new ground by considering the HR
decision-making process using actual field data and by focusing on the
advice-seeking and advice-utilization process. In fact, very little is
known about the quality of HR consulting advice and its effects on
realized hiring decisions by client firms. In particular, we extend prior
research by exploring the consequences of individual advice on hiring
decisions; we juxtapose the benefits and pitfalls of these decisions
versus those, which, potentially, could have been derived from con-
sensus recommendations. Second, we discuss the benefits and
caveats of using external advisors in recruitment processes. Specifi-
cally, we show that seeking outside advice affects the quality of
matching applicants with the hiring firm. Third, we identify incongru-
ences with respect to advice-seeking and advice-utilization. In doing
so, we open up the “black box” of value creation in the HR consulting
business. We analyze in particular the extent to which HR consultants
offer a poignant assessment of candidates, the extent to which the cli-
ent follows their advice, and the effectiveness of their recommenda-
tions in influencing the client's subsequent hiring decisions. Along
these lines, our results also provide a methodological framework to
better understand hiring biases and to overcome situations that
inherit the potential for functional, personal, and sociodemographic
inbreeding (Smith & White, 1987).
We propose that the hiring firm seeks advice to obtain a better-
informed opinion but also to overcome the burden of responsibility
and to avoid being blamed for hiring candidates that later fall short of
expectations. In line with this reasoning, the HR consultants deviate
from the initial default preferences of the hiring firm and recommend
a large variety of candidates. Although the hiring firm shies away from
drawing up a sharp hiring profile, the advisors provide their recom-
mendations based on distinct preferences. Importantly, their
suggested competency profiles improve decision-making in the hiring
firm. The consultants' recommendations are particularly helpful in sep-
arating very suitable from clearly unsuitable candidates. Due to the
consultancy's more poignant soft skill scoring, the hiring firm must still
act agentic in the mid-tier of the soft skill distribution.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next
section explains the source and quality of the data and develops the
theoretical background for our investigation. Section 3 contains our
empirical investigation. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 dis-
cusses our findings in light of implications, limitations, and avenues for
future research. Section 6 concludes.
2 | BACKGROUND
2.1 | Advice-seeking during the recruitment
process: The case
We observe a large-scale recruitment process for rank-and-file man-
agement positions. The Western European logistics corporation Logis-
tics Manager (not the company's real name) seeks to fill up to
100 vacancies. All of these jobs are positioned on the same hierarchi-
cal level and share the same job description. Successful candidates
must possess a tertiary degree in business or a closely related field.
Advertising the positions attracts roughly 1,000 applications.2
Logistics Manager therefore decides to ask for help in organizing this
recruitment process. To this end, it hires the internationally operating
human resources consultancy Soft Recruiter (not the consultancy's
real name). Soft Recruiter is organized as a partnership and specializes
in soft skill assessments. The recruitment consultancy administers an
assessment center to evaluate the applicants' soft skill endowments
and to provide a hiring recommendation for the client company. The
client company retains agency in subsequent hiring decisions.
In the first stage of the hiring and consultation process, Logistics
Manager's human resources and Soft Recruiter's executive manage-
ment jointly preselect applicants on grounds of formal education and
professional experience. After sifting through the applications, Soft
Recruiter and Logistics Manager agree to invite approximately
400 applicants to participate in the assessment center.
In the second stage, Soft Recruiter's assessors evaluate the appli-
cants' soft skill profiles. The two assessors are characterized as
1Everest Group (2018).
2To further protect the identities of the consultant and its client firm, we do not provide
exact figures on the numbers of applicants and participants in the recruitment process. For
the same reason, we collect a random sample of 300 individuals from the pool of participants
for our analysis. There are 281 complete observations. In a formal letter of confidentiality,
the consultant company and we have agreed on the descriptive information regarding the
two firms and the assessors, which we disclose in this paper.
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follows. Assessor 1 is a woman from the USA who is regularly
employed by Soft Recruiter. She is fluent in the local language. Asses-
sor 2 had a career as head of human resources in a large corporation.
Since leaving this position, he has been self-employed as HR consul-
tant. The assessors rate the preselected applicants' soft skills, aggre-
gate their ratings to evaluate candidates according to key job
competencies that are defined by Soft Recruiter's management, and
provide hiring recommendations.
Applicants are scheduled to enter the assessment center in
groups of eight. Soft Recruiter assigns one of two assessors to each of
these groups, to observe and rate the applicants' behaviors and per-
formances in the assessment exercises. To assess candidates, a so-
called in-basket exercise asks applicants to organize tasks on behalf of
a fictitious third person, and a group discussion exercise asks appli-
cants to find a solution to accelerate a company process.3
Observing their assigned groups, Soft Recruiter's assessors ini-
tially rate applicants according to eight different soft skill items: Emo-
tional Stability, Openness/Extraversion, Criticism/Conflict Resolution
Skills, Teamwork Skills, Communication Skills, Decisiveness, Self-
Organization Skills, and Systematic Approach. Item ratings are done
on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors at 7 for exceptional and 1 for
poor.
Subsequently, the assessors are asked to aggregate subsets of
their 8-item ratings to evaluate applicants in terms of three key job
competencies. Personal Competency aggregates the ratings for the
items Emotional Stability and Openness/Extraversion; Social
Communication Competency comprises Criticism/Conflict Resolution
Skills, Teamwork Skills, and Communication Skills; and Activity/
Leadership/Time Management collects the item ratings for Decisive-
ness, Self-Organization Skills, and Systematic Approach.4 Logistics
Manager did not provide a profile of required soft skills needed for
the job and assessors work without a formal rule on how to carry out
these aggregations. Finally, the recruiters formulate hiring recommen-
dations. They state whether the applicant is well-suited, suited, or not
suited for the job.
Nonetheless, Logistics Manager exclusively makes the hiring deci-
sions. In the third stage, Logistics Manager invites all applicants who
participate in the assessment center for interviews by line managers
and further testing of their cognitive and professional skills. For rea-
sons of confidentiality, Logistics Manager did not uncover its notes
and test data for this research. However, we know the final hiring
decisions.
2.2 | The need for advice-seeking by the hiring
firm
Generally, having choices and in particular, having the right to choose,
is the sine qua non of modern economies. Individuals cherish choice
autonomy and eschew unsolicited advice, and a lack of choice can
threaten happiness and, at the extreme, even well-being (Fitzsimons &
Lehmann, 2004; Steffel & Williams, 2017; Usta & Häubl, 2011). Yet
when facing difficult choices, those choices that involve ambiguity,
uncertainty, and where decision-makers are to be held accountable
for their choices, decision-makers delegate, ask for advice, or opt for
default options (Anderson, 2003; Steffel & Williams, 2017). Prior
research has shown that increasingly, decisions that are more difficult
undermine the decision-makers' confidence (Steffel & Williams, 2017).
If decision-makers feel that it is more likely that they may regret
their choices (Zeelenberg, 1999), they become more likely to avoid
(or at least delay) their decision-making (Anderson, 2003; Janis &
Mann, 1976).
When individuals ask for help, they expect to reduce the costs
of achieving an expected outcome. When asking for advice, individ-
uals are seeking out solutions or processes to address a potential
challenge. In the hiring case, which we investigate, Logistics Man-
ager is asking for advice regarding which candidates to hire. More
importantly, its management wishes to obtain a reasoning that can
serve to justify its decisions. Noteworthy, in our instance, advice-
seeking is markedly different from pure help-seeking behavior; the
advice recipient, Logistics Manager, explicitly asks for a prescriptive
course of action and, yet, retains full agency in the decision-making
process. The quality of this advice-seeking–advice-utilization pro-
cess relies on informational congruence between the advisor and
the advisee.
Uncertainty over outcomes is always prevalent for those making
the decision; although in ex-post evaluations, negative outcomes
oftentimes appear inevitable and obvious (El Zein & Bahrami, 2019). If
individuals perceive a decision to be complex and potentially difficult,
they tend to avoid this decision-making situation (Steffel & Williams,
2017). Evidently, decision-makers face the risk of being personally
blamed if their decisions lead to unsatisfactory results. Individuals
who are asked to take difficult decisions therefore experience regret,
blame, and the burden of responsibility of a potentially nonoptimal
decision (Schneider & Leyer, 2019). Importantly, incentives to avoid
taking responsibility for others are not just based on personal beliefs.
Rather, prior work has shown that poor decision-making leads to real
consequences for those who had to decide; they are evaluated nega-
tively themselves even if results are not entirely negative (Kruger,
Burrus, & Kressel, 2009).
When the potential consequences of decisions are significant,
individuals wish to cede decisions to others (Steffel, Williams, &
Perrmann-Graham, 2016). Hence, Edelson, Polania, Ruff, Fehr, and
Hare (2018) report that many of the subjects in their experiments
exhibit responsibility aversion; they were not willing to assume
responsibility for others and therefore refused to lead. This responsi-
bility avoidance is exacerbated by the fact that poor choices often
induce more exposure and attention than good choices (Steffel et al.,
2016). Hence, individuals wish to avoid bad outcomes rather than get-
ting credit for good outcomes.
Consequently, individuals who are faced with more difficult deci-
sions are also more open for decision support and ex-ante reviews of
decisions. This logic is consistent with studies on delegation, which
3On the preferred use of such exercises in Western Europe compared to other parts of the
world, see, for example, Krause and Thornton III (2009).
4In the following, we refer to this third key competency only as “Activity Management.”
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report that, if individuals are facing difficult choices, choices they are
likely to regret, or decisions with a high risk of failure, they prefer to
give up autonomy (Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007;
Redelmeier & Shafir, 1995; Steffel et al., 2016; Tversky & Shafir,
1992). The tendency to cede decision-making to others is even more
pronounced when decisions are made on behalf of others and not for
oneself; if the outcome of the choice affects others, individuals per-
ceive the situation as more daunting than if the consequences would
only be realized privately. Thus, the expectation to bear the blame by
others blocks making the decision in the first place.
Accordingly, Logistics Manager may want to shield and protect
their organization in general, and their HR management in particular
from the blame associated with hiring failures. Clearly, filling
100 vacancies at the same time leaves a lot of room for potential fail-
ure. Prior research has shown that involving others in the decisions
can help to protect individual decision-makers. Collective action for
uncertain outcomes reduces the amount of individual blame because
mistakes cannot be attributed personally (El Zein, Bahrami, & Hertwig,
2019; Morey et al., 2012). The discomfort and displeasure that their
decisions might cause for others induces decision-makers to turn
toward third parties for relief. Steffel, Williams, and Perrmann-Graham
(2016: p. 33) set forth that “[…] the ability to shoulder responsibility
for the decision is more important than expertise when it comes to
deciding for others, especially when a negative outcome seems
possible.”
Summarizing, through asking for advice and giving the impression
of a joint and collective hiring decision, the hiring firm, Logistics Man-
ager, becomes less vulnerable and less likely to be held accountable
when potential hires turn out bad.
2.3 | The consequences of advice provision on
advisee decision-making
The advice on which Logistics Manager relies comes from HR
experts who bring in their own set of experiences and, thus, pro-
vide a new perspective to the hiring firm. As such, the HR special-
ists of Soft Recruiter can decide individually. Thus, their advice and
errors do not vary systematically; “[w]hen people form opinions
independently, their thought processes and motives are less
affected by informational and normative influence, which allows
them to convey an opinion based mainly on their own knowledge
and expertise (Rader, Larrick, & Soll, 2017: p. 8).” The independent
advice is an important input for Logistics Manager's selection pro-
cess; it helps to overcome conformity biases, which reflect the
assessors' intentions to confirm what they think the client wants
and to avoid anchoring that would result in jointly producing more
similar advice.
Critically though, Soft Recruiter's HR specialists must succeed in
improving the Logistics Manager's decision-making. Related research
in the consumer domain finds that individuals who must choose for
others typically offer a greater variety, hoping that some of their rec-
ommended choices will meet the consent of the other (Choi, Kim,
Choi, & Yi, 2006). And those who give advice consider fewer attri-
butes of the decision, which is noteworthy. They de-emphasize
socially desirable dimensions and consequences of the decision
(Jonas & Frey, 2003; Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Also, they may recom-
mend more responsible choices, for example when providing financial
advice (Ward & Lynch, 2019; Zikmund-Fisher, Sarr, Fagerlin, & Ubel,
2006). Thus, recommending a course of action that is in the interest
of the advice recipient involves a strong recipient focus on the side of
the advisor.
Generally, such recommendations will therefore achieve a
trade-off between the advice's recipients and the advisor's prefer-
ences (Liu, Dallas, & Fitzsimmons, 2019). More importantly, in our
case, Soft Recruiter's HR specialists only inform Logistics Manager's
decision-makers whereas autonomy over the decision still rests with
the client company as the advice recipient. Taking the recruitment
decisions independently but conditionally on Soft Recruiter's advice
is key for Logistics Manager's HR department's self-concept; they
do not follow the advice blindly (Brooks et al., 2015; Tost, Gino, &
Larrick, 2012).
For the hiring decisions under investigation, Soft Recruiter's
assessors provide a single recommendation for each candidate and
inform about the candidates' individual attributes on which they base
their recommendation. Using their evaluations of competencies and
through their advices, they make a pointed assessment of the appli-
cants. Unlike Logistics Manager itself, Soft Recruiter's HR specialists
place emphasis on characteristics that they individually think serve
best to predict future job performance.5 Accordingly, the two asses-
sors can be expected to differ both in their evaluations of applicants'
soft skill profiles and in their way of reaching their recommendations.
At the same time, they are also expected to recommend a larger vari-
ety of individuals to Logistics Manager for further consideration. This
recommendation behavior of Soft Recruiter's experts matches Logis-
tics Manager's intentions in seeking their advice; as shown, for exam-
ple, by Van Swol and Ludutsky (2007); individuals relying on advice
are more tolerant for discrepant opinions if these are based on differ-
ent perspectives than their own.6
Consequently, we anticipate that more independent and possibly
divergent advice offered by Soft Recruiter's HR experts helps Logis-
tics Manager to take better-informed hiring decisions. When deciding
on the basis of its own prioritized objectives, Logistics Manager can
even choose to incorporate the recommendation and, separately, the
information about the assessment criteria. Thus, the client's manage-
ment can either gain access to additional information or only validate
its own expectations about the employee alternatives. In either case,
Soft Recruiter's advice is expected to reduce uncertainty and to
increase the chances to avoid mistakes. Hence, we conjecture that
the advice increases precision in Logistics Manager's hiring process.
Despite the differences in ratings and aggregation of ratings between
5In this regard, Hutzinger (2013) shows that a rater's personality and perceived expert status
imprints his/her preferences even when being embedded in a group's decision.
6Judges, for example, benefit from the provision of diverging opinions from experts that have
been called by the plaintiffs and defendants to inform their opinion (Broomell & Budescu,
2009).
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the two assessors, we therefore expect to have a strong overlap
between each of the two advisors' hiring recommendations and the
actual hiring decisions.
3 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 | Soft skill ratings and the evaluation of key job
competencies
Table 1 provides summary statistics and bivariate correlations. We
obtain complete observations regarding the appraisals of 281 appli-
cants. The group assignment information is missing for two of these
candidates. Hence, 279 applicants can be associated with Assessor
1 (N = 120) or Assessor 2 (N = 159). The candidate pool is character-
ized by an almost even split of men and women, with a mean age of
around 40 and 12 years of relevant job experience. Roughly, one
fourth of them possess a graduate degree, and 8% are internal candi-
dates, current employees of the client firm. We also analyzed the dis-
tribution of candidate characteristics assigned to each assessor. We
find no evidence for statistically significant differences between the
two candidate pools (results are not tabulated but available upon
request from the authors).
Logistics Manager and Soft Recruiter agreed on a rating system
comprising eight dimensions. These dimensions are listed as the
first eight variables in Table 1. Logistics Manager did not provide a
profile of required soft skills, and Soft Recruiter broadly specified
three key dimensions they would like to see reflected in the assess-
ment of candidates: Personal Competency comprises Emotional
Stability and Openness/Extraversion equally. Social Communication
Competency is equally weighted among the dimensions Criticism/
Conflict Resolution Skills, Teamwork Skills, and Communication
Skills, and Activity/Leadership/Time Management equally reflects
the dimensions Decisiveness, Self-Organization Skills, and System-
atic Approach.
A separate factor analysis actually identifies only two distinct fac-
tors. Factor 1 comprises Emotional Stability, Openness/Extraversion,
Criticism/Conflict Resolution Skills, Teamwork, and Communication.
Cronbach's alpha indicates a very high internal consistency (.93). Fac-
tor 2 includes the remaining items. In the following, we refer to Factor
1 as “People Skills” and Factor 2 as “Analytical Skills.” In our subse-
quent analyses of the determinants of the assessors' hiring recom-
mendations and the client firm's hiring decisions, we use both Soft
Recruiter's three competencies model and our own two-factor model
in delineating differences between raters and in studying antecedents
to subsequent hiring decisions.
Following our line of arguments from above, we suspect that each
of the two assessors provides advice that informs the hiring company
about potential strengths and weaknesses of said candidates. Table 2
reports t tests for sample mean comparisons for each item rating by
assessor. We find sizable and highly significant differences for six out
of eight ratings. The direction of these effects reveals that Assessor
2 rates candidates consistently higher than Assessor 1. To a lesser
extent, this difference pertains to the remaining two variables, Sys-
tematic Thinking and Self-Organization; however, the former differ-
ence is only significant at the 10% level, whereas the latter is
insignificant. In summary, one assessor appears to score higher than
the other does on all but two soft skill items.
In the next step of the process, assessors have been asked to
evaluate the applicants according to the three key job competencies
agreed upon by Logistics Manager and Soft Recruiter. Again, they were
asked to use a 7-point Likert scale to carry out their aggregations of soft
skill items. Table 3 reports mean comparisons for these variables. There
are significant differences between the two assessors' evaluations of
candidates by key job competencies. These differences could mirror
the aforementioned differences in item ratings. Yet, if assessors
indeed form different expectations about the advice recipient's needs,
then both advice givers can be expected to use different individually
derived aggregation weights for the perception of the key job
competencies.
To test this prediction empirically, we analyze whether there exist
differences in the aggregation of weights between assessors. In doing
so, we apply constrained linear regressions for each of the three key
job competencies. In particular, we omit the constant term, and we
constrain the item ratings' coefficients such they add up to one.
Hence, they can be interpreted as relative aggregation weights. We
use Wald tests to compare the estimated coefficients. Table 4 shows
the regression coefficients for each assessor. We also report the dif-
ferences between coefficients and the results of the Wald significance
tests for each item and the results of the combined Wald tests.
Concerning Personal Competency, Assessor 1 puts more weight
on Emotional Stability than on Openness, whereas Assessor 2 weighs
the two items equally; with a magnitude of 14 percentage points, this
difference is large. The weights for Criticism and Communication in
the regressions on Social Communicative Competency show only small
differences between assessors. However, these differences accumu-
late to a large and significant difference of 13 percentage points in the
weights on Teamwork, roughly twice the coefficient value for Assessor
2. A similar pattern is observable for Activity/Leadership/Time Man-
agement. The assessors' weights on Decisiveness and Systematic
thinking differ only slightly. However, they add up to produce a signifi-
cant difference of 18 percentage points between the two assessors'
weights on Self-Organization, again approximately twice Assessor 2's
coefficient value. Lastly, all combined tests indicate highly significant
differences between the assessors' aggregation models. Assessor
2 weighs the different items more or less equally in his aggregations. In
contrast, Assessor 1 appears to value at least one item as less impor-
tant than another item in each of her aggregations.
Based on these results, we conclude that the aggregation models
that the two assessors use to obtain the key competency scores differ
significantly. In Table 4, we also report large confidence intervals of
95% for the coefficient estimates. These intervals imply that the
aggregation models are subject to both interassessor and intra-
assessor difference, which further corroborates that both assessors
contribute unique information to Logistics Manager for further
consideration.
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3.2 | The hiring recommendations
Following the soft skill assessments and aggregations to obtain evalu-
ations of the key job competencies, Soft Recruiter's assessors provide
hiring recommendations for each candidate. In order to analyze how
the individual differences in assessments affect the hiring recommen-
dation, we investigate the determinants of these individual recom-
mendations using both Soft Recruiter's three competencies model and
the empirically derived two-factor model.
Table 5 reports the marginal effects of multivariate logistic regres-
sions with the assessors' hiring recommendations (cases “well suited”
and “suited” indicate a positive recommendation) as the dependent
variable. The table shows results for the pooled data and two separate
analyses for the two assessors. With Soft Recruiter's model, all three
key competencies positively affect the assessors' recommendations;
the marginal effects range from 27% (Personal Competency) to 19%
(Social–Communicative Competency).
Recall that the two assessors differ with respect to the driving
forces of their recommendation. Social–Communicative Competency
is strongly predictive of Assessor 1's recommendation (ß = 0.56, p <
.01) and has no effect on Assessor 2's recommendation. At the same
time, Personal Competency (ß = 0.23, p < .01) is predictive for Asses-
sor 2's recommendation but does not affect Assessor 1's recommen-
dations. Only Activity Management significantly predicts both
assessors' recommendations, with a larger effect in the case of Asses-
sor 1. Lastly, academic degree is the only control variable that shows a
significant impact, and only on Assessor 1's recommendation.
Once more, these results strongly support the notion that both
assessors form expectations about the skills Logistics Manager's
demands and that both assessors base their evaluation on individual
and idiosyncratic determinants. These effects are further supported
by using the two-factor model. Again, the two factors show very dis-
tinct effects. In the pooled regression, People Skills is far more impor-
tant in predicting the consultants' recommendations; the variable's
average marginal effect (ß = 0.68) is twice the size of that of Analytic
Skills (ß = 0.33). Generally, the predictive power of both factors is
stronger for Assessor 1's recommendations, with a coefficient value
for People Skills for Assessor 1 that is three times the size that for
Assessor 2 (ß = 1.26 vs. ß = 0.4). Accordingly, applicants with strong
People Skills are more likely to receive a positive recommendation
when evaluated by Assessor 1 than by Assessor 2. Concluding, both
assessors not only provide recommendations; in addition, their indi-
vidual competency ratings provide additional insights for Logistics
Manager that can be used to support its subsequent hiring decision.
3.3 | The hiring decision
Having established that each one of the two assessors provides idio-
syncratic advice to Logistics Manager, we now explore how the advice
affects the hiring decision. Given the variety of expertise offered, we
conjecture that Logistics Manager is in a better position to mitigate
the downside of their hiring decisions and leverage the upside.
Recall that candidate competencies affect the consultants' recom-
mendations. Therefore, both job competency and recommendation
effects on the client's hiring decisions may be obscured by endo-
geneity. The error terms associated with regressions using the hiring
recommendation as a predictor variable are correlated with the errors
terms of regressions using hiring decisions as the dependent variable.
Given the nature of our data, we estimate the true impacts of recom-
mendations and assessor assignment on hiring decisions by applying
treatment effect regressions with the actual hiring decision of Logis-
tics Manager as the dependent variable.7 The procedure is as follows:
in a first stage regression, we explicitly account for the relationship
between competencies and the candidate recommendation; and in
7Unlike experimental research such as medical studies, which regularly overcome such
endogeneity problems by design, our research cannot draw on additional data from placebo
tests.
TABLE 2 Item differences by assessor
Mean
Assessor 1
Mean
Assessor 2
Difference
(t stat.)
People Skills
Emotional
stability
4.06 4.64 −0.58***
(−3.88)
Openness/
Extraversion
3.85 4.54 −0.68***
(−4.35)
Criticism 3.73 4.21 −0.48**
(−2.90)
Teamwork 3.78 4.77 −0.99***
(−7.14)
Communication 3.91 4.56 −0.65***
(−4.02)
Analytic Skills
Decisiveness 4.14 4.66 −0.52***
(−4.07)
Self-
organization
3.90 4.18 −0.27
(−1.43)
Systematic
thinking
4.30 4.40 −0.10
0 (−0.56)
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
TABLE 3 Key competency differences by assessor
Mean
Assessor 1
Mean
Assessor 2
Difference/
(t-stat.)
Personal Competency 3.79 4.60 −0.81***
(−5.44)
Social–Communicative
Competency
3.75 4.50 −0.75***
(−4.87)
Activity Management 3.99 4.46 −0.47***
(−3.51)
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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the second stage, we separate these selection effects and the direct
impact of the recommendation on the hiring decision (Burke, Fraser, &
Greene, 2010).
The regression results are reported in Table 6 and show a positive
and significant effect of the recommendation on the hiring decision (ß
= 0.353, p < .001). Together with the aforementioned difference in
the likelihood of receiving a recommendation from Assessor 1 or
Assessor 2, this implies that a candidate has a higher chance to be
hired if assigned to Assessor 1. In a second regression model, we fur-
ther interact the variable “recommendation” with the other significant
second-stage variable “Analytic Skills” (ß = 0.071, p < .05). We find
that candidates with stronger Analytic Skills are more likely to benefit
from a hiring recommendation if assigned to Assessor 1 (interaction; ß
= 0.129, p < 0.05).
On the one hand, this result provides a consistency check: Logis-
tics Manager's hiring decisions appreciate the applicants' soft skill
endowments, specifically their Analytic Skills. On the other hand, it
confirms that there is a distinct recommendation effect on the client
firm's hiring choices. Our previous analyses have shown that recom-
mendations are assessor-specific and transmit different preferences
regarding soft skill profiles, that is, different perceptions of the client
firm's soft skill demand. We can therefore conclude that each of the
two recruiters' recommendations substantially influence the client
firm's hiring decisions.
TABLE 4 Constrained linear regressions of soft skill item ratings on key job competency evaluations
Assessor 1 Assessor 2
DiffCoefficient Confidence Interval (95%) Coefficient Confidence Interval (95%)
Emotional Stability 0.652*** (0.543, 0.761) 0.514*** (0.453, 0.576) 0.138**
Openness 0.348*** (0.239, 0.457) 0.486*** (0.424, 0.547) −0.138**
Combined F test (Prob>F): 0.031
Criticism 0.475*** (0.354, 0.597) 0.409*** (0.337, 0.481) 0.066
Teamwork 0.143*** (0.070, 0.216) 0.276*** (0.225, 0.328) −0.133***
Communication 0.382*** (0.248, 0.515) 0.315*** (0.236, 0.394) 0.067
Combined F test (Prob>F): 0.012
Decisiveness 0.453*** (0.351, 0.555) 0.350*** (0.309, 0.391) 0.103*
Self-Organization 0.166*** (0.085, 0.247) 0.349*** (0.282, 0.416) −0.183***
Systematic thinking 0.381*** (0.277, 0.485) 0.301*** (0.240, 0.363) 0.080
Combined F test (Prob>F): 0.002
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 5 Logistic regressions on assessors' recommendations
Logistic both
assessors
Logistic both
assessors
Logistic
Assessor 1
Logistic
Assessor 2
Logistic
Assessor 1
Logistic
Assessor 2
Recommendation
Personal Competency .273*** (0.070) .254 (0.146) .232** (0.076)
Social–Communicative
Competency
.188** (0.063) .555** (0.185) .069 (0.067)
Activity Management .222*** (0.048) .296** (0.109) .200*** (0.054)
Factor People Skills .680*** (0.080) 1.261*** (0.274) .406*** (0.074)
Factor Analytic Skills .330*** (0.065) .445** (0.140) .292*** (0.073)
Gender a −.041 (0.084) −.036 (0.079) −.021 (0.164) −.034 (0.100) .072 (0.153) −.077 (0.096)
Assessor a −.545*** (0.081) −.489*** (0.077)
Age .003 (0.011) .005 (0.010) −.012 (0.018) .016 (0.015) −.005 (0.016) .012 (0.014)
Doctoral degree a .135 (0.106) .134 (0.100) .503** (0.190) .011 (0.108) .607** (0.202) .020 (0.107)
Job experience .009 (0.012) .009 (0.011) .024 (0.022) −.001 (0.017) .028 (0.019) .001 (0.016)
Observations 281 279 157 124 155 124
Note. The table reports marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
aCoefficients apply to a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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3.4 | The effect of advice on the quality of the
hiring decision
3.4.1 | Benchmarking and recommendation
strategies
As shown in the previous section, recommendations offered by asses-
sors strongly influence subsequent hiring decisions. Yet beyond these
recommendations, our results highlight that the hiring client company
also makes extensive use of their discretionary agency in decision-
making. In line with our theoretical predictions, advice, in the form of
the hiring recommendation, represents an aggregation of underlying
assessment information. Thus, an assessor has to make choices with
respect to the form of aggregation and how the acquired information
is weighed to derive a candidate ranking that is recommend for fur-
ther perusal of Logistics Manager.
Obviously, the value of the information contained in the recom-
mendations depends on the assessment strategy, which has been
employed by each assessor. For example, the assessor can, with the
risk of possibly recommending too few candidates, opt to recommend
just the very best candidates, or recommend—in this case, risking to
endorse too many candidates—all capable applicants, that is, all those
who meet some minimal standard. In the following, we therefore
extend our analyses of the impacts of assessor recommendations on
subsequent hiring decisions by investigating differences in the two
assessors' recommendation strategies. Doing so, we aim at deriving
suggestions to improve the advice-seeking and advice-utilization
processes.
Recall that a client company generally turns to an external
recruiter for candidate assessment to receive expert guidance in mak-
ing better hiring decisions. Assessments provide such guidance by
(a) identifying candidates who, given the client's demands, should be
hired and by (b) eliminating unsuitable candidates. In the end, the
advice-seeking client company decides on hiring a candidate or not
according to its own preferences. Hence, we model the performance
of the advice-utilization process in terms of a binary classification
problem: we assess the explanatory power of the information pro-
vided by the assessors regarding the hiring decision made by the client
company.
In medicine and clinical psychology, receiver operating character-
istic (ROC) curve analysis is a well-established method to address
analogous issues, such as whether a new diagnostic test properly sep-
arates individuals who qualify for a successful therapy of a disease or
disorder from those who do not qualify for the treatment. Employing
ROC graphs allows us to investigate the quality of the advice provided
in explaining the ultimate hiring decision. Furthermore, we can bench-
mark the performance of each assessor individually and of both asses-
sors collectively to better understand the advice giving strategies on
which underlie the hiring recommendations.
We are specifically interested in the rate of true positive test
result, sensitivity: the rate of correctly recommended individuals who
were hired subsequently and specificity: the rate of true negative test
results, those candidates that were assessed as unsuitable and were
not hired subsequently.
3.4.2 | Regression specification, ROC curves, and
reference points
To assess the performance of the advice in the form of hiring recom-
mendations, we create a probabilistic classification model that
includes all assessment information given to the client yet excludes
the actual hiring recommendations to avoid overfitting the model. The
graphical representation of the classification model depicts the
explanatory power of the assessment information in explaining the
dependent variable, that is,. the final hiring decision by Logistics Man-
ager. Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, we employ a
linear logistic model. As explanatory variables, we include the item rat-
ings and the assessor's aggregations of key competencies and control
for age, academic degree, gender, and work experience.
From the logistic regression, we derive the predicted probabilities
of being hired by the client firm for each candidate and transform
these probabilities into percentiles. The first decile represents the can-
didates that the client firms considers most suitable and, thus, corre-
sponds to the best chances of being hired. Accordingly, the tenth
decile corresponds to those candidates who are least likely to be hired
given the client firm' preferences. Subsequently, we calculate the
corresponding rates of correctly predicted hirings and nonhirings for
each percentile. These two rates express the “sensitivity” and “speci-
ficity” given the information from the soft skill assessments. Using this
procedure, we calculate and plot three such curves. The first
TABLE 6 Treatment effect models
Full
Model
Interaction
Model
Hired
People Skills −0.023 −0.025
Analytic Skills 0.071* 0.024
Recommendation 0.353*** 0.335***
Analytic Skills × Recommendation 0.129*
Constant 0.033 0.026
Recommendation
Personal Competency 0.747*** 0.747***
Social–Communicative Competency 0.546** 0.546**
Activity Management 0.624*** 0.624***
Age 0.005 0.005
Gender −0.129 −0.129
Degree 0.379 0.379
Job experience 0.037 0.037
Assessor −1.757*** −1.757***
Constant −8.407*** −8.407***
Mills Ratio −0.154* −0.147*
Observations 279 279
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
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characterizes the quality of the recruitment consultant firm's assess-
ment process; that is, in this case, we pool the data for both assessors
and only add an assessor dummy into the regression; hence, we model
the impact of the consultancy's recommendations as a whole based
on two individual assessors' evaluation expertise. Next, we derive
ROC curves for each assessor separately. We depict our results in
Figures 1–3.
The first and, possibly, most important benchmark addresses
whether the assessor's advice is helpful for the client at all. For this
purpose, note that the diagonal connecting the top left corner (100%
F IGURE 1 Receiver operating characteristic
curve for the recruitment consultancy. Legend:
Maximum Rate–correctly classified: 75%, cutoff
point: top 33 %; Minimum Number–correctly
classified: 85%, cutoff point: top 19 %; Maximum
Number–correctly classified: 87%, cutoff point:
top 15 %; Assessors–correctly classified: 68%,
cutoff point (estimated): top 40% [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
F IGURE 2 Receiver operating characteristic
curve for Assessor 1. Legend: Maximum Rate–
correctly classified: 81%, cutoff point: top 30 %;
Maximum Number 2–correctly classified: 85%,
cutoff point: top 16 %; Minimum Number–
correctly classified: 83, cutoff point: top 21 %;
Assessor 1–correctly classified: 67.8%, cutoff
point: top 43.3% [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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sensitivity and 0% specificity) with the bottom right corner (100 %
specificity and 0% sensitivity) corresponds to the outcomes that
would result from a purely random classification model. Points found
below this diagonal indicate that the assessment information would
have actually misled the client in making its preferred choices. Con-
versely, a curve that bows above the diagonal implies that the assess-
ment information is predictive of the client's decision-making.
Generally, the closer the ROC curve extends toward the upper right
corner in the graph, the better the assessors' recommendations
explain the subsequent hiring decisions. Turning toward our results,
Figure 1 clearly shows that involving the external recruiter's expertise
in soft skill assessments transfers valuable information for the client
firm's recruitment decisions. Also, the consultancy's classification
point is very close to the ROC curve, which suggests that the consul-
tancy and the hiring firm arrived at similar conclusions about candi-
dates' fit for the job.
Because we, as academic researchers, cannot be sure whether, in
this particular case, hiring a nonqualified applicant is relatively more or
less costly in comparison with not hiring a suitable candidate, we
construct different reference points that, in our view, reflect plausible
goals. Our first reference point is denoted by “Maximum Number”; it
maximizes the total number of both true positive and true negative
assessment outcomes while holding the total number of correct
classifications constant. Because there are more candidates than
positions, this measure is skewed toward rather sorting out clear
nonhiring cases to improve classification performance. The second
reference point, “Maximum Rates,” maximizes the diagnostic quality
of the assessment process; that is, it maximizes the sum of specificity
and sensitivity. In particular, this measure adjusts for group size.
Lastly, in order to reflect that clients might prefer quantity to quality,
our third reference point, “Minimum Number,” postulates that there
must be at least one recommended candidate per open position. By
construction, our first reference point, Maximum Number, is always
located closer to the top right corner (indicating 100% specificity and
sensitivity) compared with the latter two points, Maximum Rates and
Minimum Number.
3.4.3 | Assessing the quality of the
recommendations
Following the ROC curve from left to right, Soft Recruiter's recom-
mendation decisions collectively become more selective, eliminating
more and more of the low-scoring candidates from the groups of suit-
able applicants. Moving in this direction, we observe that the trajec-
tory slopes downwards more strongly. This suggests an idiosyncrasy
of the assessment process: it performs well at identifying candidates
who are either clearly qualified or clearly unqualified but fails to dis-
tinguish borderline cases. In the following, we explore whether this
observation reflects that both assessors' follow the same recommen-
dation strategy. Alternatively, it could be an artifact, which is induced
by our inclusion of two individual assessors' evaluations in a single
model.
Figures 2 and 3 show the ROC curves using the data for each
assessor separately. Assessor 1's assessment outcome coincides with
the outcome of the assessment process for the consultancy as a
whole as depicted in Figure 1. The curve indicates that Assessor
1 achieves very good results regarding the sensitivity criterion.
F IGURE 3 Receiver operating characteristic
curve for Assessor 2. Legend: Maximum Rate–
correctly classified: 84%, cutoff point: top 27 %;
Minimum Number–correctly classified: 88%,
cutoff point: top 16 %; Maximum Number–
correctly classified: 91%, cutoff point: top 13 %;
Assessor 2–correctly classified: 68.9%, cutoff
point: top 36.4% [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Assessor 1 succeeds in assigning nonhiring recommendations to the,
according to her own soft skill evaluations, poorest candidates
without sacrificing on the quality of classifying suitable candidates. In
accordance with our theoretical discussion, Assessor 1 offers a larger
quantity and broader variety of candidates for the client firm's
management to choose from. She is also able to distinguish mid-range
from high performers as well as weeding out low performers.
Lastly, Assessor 1 achieves a very high level of congruence with
Logistics Manager; her classification point is located almost on the
ROC curve.
Assessor 2 is playing to different strengths. His ROC curve indi-
cates that his advice is especially beneficial in the high specificity area.
Assessor 2 successfully recommends top candidates without rec-
ommending too many candidates for hiring that were eventually not
hired. To be precise, his performance in evaluating the soft skills of
applicants is better than average in the top six deciles of candidates,
which are ranked according to the client company's revealed hiring
preferences. However, Assessor 2's evaluations are less predictive
than those of Assessor 1 in successfully separating low and mid-level
ranked candidates. Lastly, note that Assessor 2's classification point
lies substantially off and, more importantly, below the ROC curve. Evi-
dently, Assessor 2 failed to choose an adequate model to aggregate
the information contained in his own evaluations.
In summary, we conclude that quality of the recommendation
process is almost the same for each assessor (as indicated by the area
under the curve), yet we find distinct strengths and weaknesses for
each assessor. Both assessors seem to have employed different
assessment information and advice strategies and, therefore, per-
formed differently along the range of candidates who received their
individual recommendations. A final comparison with our reference
points shows that the performance achieved by Assessor 1 is closest
to the Maximum Rates reference point on the ROC curve. This asses-
sor therefore most closely achieves the objective of maximizing the
diagnostic quality of the assessment process. Recall, however, that
this well-acceptable goal from the point of view of HR experts does
not necessarily correspond to the objective of a client firm in a partic-
ular recruitment process. Thus, Assessor 2's realized classification
point is located closest to our Minimum Number reference point.
Clearly, Assessor 2 has tried to compromise between the goal of maxi-
mizing the diagnostic quality of the assessment process and his cli-
ent's (likely) goal of involving an external recruiter for enlarging the
pool of suitable applicants.
4 | DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND
FURTHER RESEARCH
4.1 | Discussion of findings
Analyzing the case of a large-scale, partially outsourced recruitment
process yields three key insights into the advice-seeking and advice-
utilization process: first, we find that assessors form different expec-
tations about the advice recipient's needs. Consequently, the
advisors employ different, that is, individually derived, weights when
aggregating their soft skill ratings to obtain scores for the candidates'
key job competencies. We suggest that such divergent opinions
reflect the following theoretical rationale: when providing advice for
the hiring company, the advisors must balance the recipients' prefer-
ences with their own personal views. Soft Recruiter's assessors
therefore recommend options that, in their own individual opinion,
best reflect the preferences, that is, the skill demands, of Logistics
Manager.
Next, recall that the two assessors differ with respect to the
underlying criteria for recommendations (Assessor 1: Social–
Communicative Competency; Assessor 2: Personal Competency). This
finding suggests that both assessors form different expectations
about the skills, which their client might demand; the determinants of
their evaluations are individual and idiosyncratic. The literature on
prospective thinking and mental simulation discusses how individuals
conjecture, project, and engage in mental activities to get a sense of
possible future outcomes (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998).
Hence, research that would be directed at providing a more detailed
understanding of how the recommendation belief of assessors are
formed could help to disentangle the extent to which their assess-
ments are based on their professional expertise and to what extent
they are driven by the commercial goal to infer their client's demands
(Loftus & Mazzoni, 1998).
Lastly, our results establish the influence of each of the two
advisors hiring recommendations on the subsequent hiring decisions.
Specifically, we find that both assessors' recommendations affect
the client firm's hiring decisions, although they each reflect individu-
ally different opinions in regards to the skill profile that would serve
the client best. As it concerns the client's own emphasis on specific
skills, we find that candidates' Analytic Skills are predictive of hiring
decisions. As it concerns the overall quality of the hiring process,
expert guidance should either identify candidates who satisfy the
clients hiring demands or eliminate unsuitable candidates. In regard
to the goal of providing poignant assessments, we find that Asses-
sor 1 performs relatively well in correctly recommending individuals
who were hired subsequently, whereas Assessor 2 was better in fil-
tering out those candidates as unsuitable that were not hired
subsequently.
Existing literature suggests that individuals are more tolerant for
discrepant opinions if these are expert and fact based. In the light of
our results, we expect it to be worthwhile to further explore how
assessor evaluations could be improved by forcing them to find a
common yet still poignant ground (Van Swol & Ludutsky, 2007).
Again, on first sight, the client firm could have benefitted if candidates
would not have been exclusively assigned to only one of two asses-
sors and, instead, both assessors' expert assessments would have
entered each candidate assessment. Yet, following the remainder of
our investigation, this benefit would only arise if such coordination
between assessors would not average out their divergent opinions.
Rather, the assessors should have prediscussed their recommenda-
tions and inform the client about the reasons to disagree on cases.
The hiring firm could have used this information to improve its
12 FABEL ET AL.
precision when deciding on candidates, which were not evaluated as
clearly suited or nonsuited.
4.2 | Implications and contributions
Our study advances the advice-seeking and advice-utilization litera-
ture in several important ways. First, although prior work has focused
on one-sided perspectives on advice-seeking or advice giving, we con-
sider the final hiring decision by the advisee as conditional on the rec-
ommendation provided by the advisor. Our research therefore
advances our understanding how the individual facets of advice pro-
vided affect the decision taken by the advisee subsequently. Along
these lines, our research advances our general understanding of
advice-seeking and advice-utilization as an interpersonal learning pro-
cess. The offering of divergent opinions of advisors has important
implications for advice-utilization. Those making the judgments and
decisions are more likely to be persuaded if experts provided pointed
and divergent opinions. This is important, as the literature on advice-
utilization in hiring has swayed to the consequences of recommenda-
tions derived from group consensus. As a case in point, there is a
growing interest in team staffing to improve hiring decisions (Munyon
et al., 2011; Zaccaro & Dirosa, 2012; Mathieu, Tannenbaum, Dons-
bach, & Alliger, 2014). Extending these research streams, we explore
the consequences of individual (independent and unfiltered) advice on
the decision-making by superiors and juxtapose the benefits and pit-
falls of individual decisions versus those, which can potentially be
derived from consensus recommendations.
We also contribute to prior work on advice-taking that broadly
suggests how advice-taking behavior by the advice seeker is
influenced by recipients' assessments of advisors (Reyt et al.,
2016). Our results strongly suggest that advice-taking is conditional
on the likely consequences of decisions that follow after the advice
has been offered. Although relying on individual advice has bene-
fits at the extremes of the soft skill distribution, it performs worse
in the intermediate range. As such, individual recommendations can
increase the boom or bust nature of hiring, by avoiding to average
out across skills. This can be an important feature when the bene-
fits of hiring successes loom larger and subsequent performance
failures do not affect the financial and organizational bottom-line
extensively. Along these lines, our work also challenges a prior
notion that presumes that seeking help reflects an inability to inde-
pendently complete tasks (Brooks et al., 2015). Rather, we show
that whether or not the recipient will follow the advice is contin-
gent on the consequences the recipient expects from the decision
to be made.
Our findings also inform research on hiring decisions for the
upper management of the organization. Given that preferences are
revealed through individual ratings for each assessor's hiring recom-
mendation, we can delineate biases that underlie the recommenda-
tions and provide an empirical tool to assess and potentially overcome
such biases. Beyond the practical recommendation to potentially
invite more candidates that underwent scrutiny by the assessor who
assesses more strictly, our results also inform related research. Hiring
decisions formed by boards, as is typical for upper management posi-
tions, document that boards tend to favor executives that are similar
to themselves, in terms of appearance and demographics (Graham,
Harvey, & Puri, 2016; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). These evaluation
biases are especially powerful when rational factors and objective
information are difficult to obtain (Pfeffer, 1992). As such, these
situations inherit the potential for functional, personal, and
sociodemographic inbreeding (Smith & White, 1987).
Potentially and more importantly, future studies may need to
investigate if and to what extent selection processes lead to a system-
atic discrimination of certain types of potential managers
(e.g., individuals that do not possess the traits and features that are
typically associated with soft skills and ability for performing certain
jobs). Our methodological framework provides grounds to test for the
how of consequences of certain types of biases and discrimination in
hiring processes.
4.3 | Limitations and avenues for future research
Our study has to acknowledge several limitations though. Investigat-
ing a case, we could only aim at shedding some first light into the
black box of RPO. In this regard, optimizing the diagnostic quality of
its assessments may be an adequate objective for a recruitment con-
sultancy that competes in the RPO market. Yet, a hiring company's
recruitment goal depends on the relative costs associated with hiring
an unsuitable applicant vis-à-vis not hiring a suitable one. These costs
reflect the scarcity of particular talent in the labor market where a
particular client firm meets up with its competitors and are deter-
mined by the necessities and opportunities to attract employees for
shorter or longer terms. Although, at present, we can only illustrate
plausible client goals, in practice, a hiring firm will be aware of its cost
structure.
Finally, our analysis does not address soft skill assessment
effects that arise from the particular way of organizing the
assessment center that deviates from best practices (see
e.g., International Taskforce on Assessment Center Guidelines,
2015). In particular, assigning only one assessor to each applicant
group invites the risk that rater personality and rater–ratee
matches may lead to biased candidate assessments. One reason for
ignoring the issue in this study is that interrater reliability is high
for trained professionals, and “various forms of assessor bias largely
appear trivial.” (Putka & Hoffman, 2013: p. 114). More importantly
though, advice-seeking and advice-utilization processes involve
more interactions between HR experts who, as assessors, rate
candidates' soft skills and, as consultants, advise their clients on
who to hire (Kinnunen & Parviainen, 2016).
Thus, although, in our case, it had been labelled as an assessment
center exercise, the assessments themselves did not directly aim at
selecting new employees, as it is modeled when testing for productiv-
ity effects of soft skills (Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, & Kautz,
2011). Reaching beyond obtaining candidates' soft skill assessments,
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the client firm asked for advice on potential hires and, in this regard,
asked for poignant recommendations. Hence, the process itself and
the implicative quality of its outcomes rather resemble a headhunting
scenario, as studied by, for example, Brands and Fernandez-Mateo
(2017). This previous work using actual field data shows that, in their
preselection of candidates to be presented to client firms, recruitment
consultants “bend the pipeline” against women. However, the studies
lack detailed information on how the recruiters arrive at their recom-
mendations. Our study complements the existing scarce field research
on recruitment outsourcing by uncovering their opinions regarding
the client company's skill demands, the transmission of these opinions
into recommendations, and their subsequent influences on the client
company's hiring decisions.
5 | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We draw on unique data from a partially outsourced recruitment pro-
cess to fill 100 rank-and-file management positions. On first sight, the
hiring firm turned to a professionally specialized consultancy with the
sole goal of obtaining assessments of its applicants' soft skills. How-
ever, closer investigation revealed that the consultancy's assessors
actually advised their client in making hiring decisions in which the hir-
ing firm retains full agency in decision-making. We therefore investi-
gated the advice-seeking and advice-utilization process to determine
how the information that is contained in the consultancy's expert
advice affects the subsequent hiring decisions.
Field research on the determinants and effects of consultancy
advice only rarely enters academic discussions. From an explorative
point of view, our study therefore complements the few existing
studies on RPO and the underlying information-gathering and
decision-making process. Thus, our analysis shows that the
consultancy's two assessors significantly differ not only in their rating
candidates, but also in their aggregation of ratings to compute key
competency scores and their appreciation of these competencies that
leads to the hiring recommendation. However, despite these differ-
ences, we find that each of the two assessors provides information
and recommendations, which distinctly guide the client firm's hiring
decisions.
Recruitment for management positions requires making difficult
decisions with long-term consequences, significantly affecting both
the applicants' and the hiring firms' development. Hence, decision-
makers in hiring firms are open for expert advice and appreciate diver-
gent opinions. At the same time, seeking advice allows them to shift
perceived responsibility for outcomes. In such situations, advisors
who, for their own and their employer's benefit, must meet their
client's skill demands can be expected to recommend a large variety
of candidates as suitable for the hiring firm: in our case, both advisors
were clear about separating certainly unsuitable from just as certainly
suitable applicants. However, in order to enhance space for client
choices, they failed to provide clear-cut hiring recommendations in
the mid-tier of the soft skill distribution. Moreover, we find that—
likely compromising between his employer's and his perceived client
interests—one of the two advisors did not fully exploit this advisory
potential.
These findings call for cooperation between assessors to improve
decision quality. Yet, the two assessors not only provide distinctly dif-
ferent skill ratings, competency scorings, and recommendations; each
of the advisors also contributes a distinctly helpful guiding opinion to
the client firm. This observation then equally warrants caution
regarding the way to organize such cooperation. And averaging out
divergent opinions must be avoided especially.
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